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ABSTRACT
Empirical evidence of the relationship between administrative
capacity and the use of EU funds is plentiful. According to
this strand in literature, the complexity of spending rules is key in
explaining the implementation gap. What would happen should
administrative requirements be relaxed? This paper looks into the
implementation of the European Fund for the Integration of third
country nationals (EIF), a fund with simpler spending rules and yet a
higher rate of unused money. Adapting the hypotheses put forth in
absorption literature to the specifics of the EIF, I confront capacity-
based explanations to (under-explored) preference-based ones in a
comparative fashion. Even when spending EU money is easier,
strong support is found for capacity explanans and little for
preferences. Even so, administrative capacity appears to be only one
factor amongst many, with financial capacity and decentralization
playing strong roles too. Empirical evidence is drawn from the
application of time-series cross-section methods to an original dataset.
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The European Union (EU) counts a number of funds enforcing solidarity and cohesion
amongst its member states. At the end of each implementation period, a significant
share of these is not spent, thus undermining the goals they are intended to tackle.
Recently a strand in literature has developed to explain why EU member states do not
spend their allocations. Most of these studies have converged towards the importance
of administrative capacity as a main explanans of the implementation gap (Hapenciuc,
Moroşan, and Gaube 2013; Bachtler, Mendez, and Oraže 2014; Tosun 2014; Terracciano
and Graziano 2016). Indeed, spending EU funds can prove testing since it requires a sound
administrative and organizational structure. What would then happen if the administra-
tive requirements for the spending of EU funds were relaxed? The implementation of the
European Fund for the Integration of third country nationals (EIF), a fund with looser
spending rules and yet a higher percentage of unused money, offers a puzzling answer.
Whilst, following Tosun (2014), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
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was absorbed up to 92.4% by the end of 2008, the use of EIF money stalled at 82.3% at the
end of its implementation period in 2014.
This article takes the EIF as a case-study and aims to investigate the reasons why
member states do not use the money they have available, even when spending rules are
relaxed. Building upon the findings relating to the implementation of the structural
funds, I test the role of capacity in explaining the share of unused money. I also
propose alternative explanations that I draw from compliance literature; namely, I test
hypotheses relating to the role of politics in the use of EU funds. Preferences also
feature in late absorption research (Dotti 2016; Hagemann 2017, 2019) but results have
so far been very limited in scope1 and have proposed partial conceptualizations of politics.
This article therefore refines both sets of hypotheses and adjusts them to the specifics of
the EIF, which, I argue, is a good case to confront capacity-based explanations to prefer-
ence-based ones. Firstly, the fact that, on the one hand, the EIF features simpler spending
rules and, on the other hand, it has to do with immigration – an ever-more sensitive issue
for Europe’s public opinions and governments – likely deflates the role of administrative
capacity and inflates that of preferences, thus shedding some more light onto under-
explored explanations. Secondly, as spending EIF money is assumed to be easier than
spending structural funds money, it offers a good opportunity to test whether cutting
red tape is the way to go if the EU is willing to increase absorption rates. Thirdly, the
EIF presents characteristics that are similar to EU structural funds, thus suggesting that
some of the results presented here may be relevant for their implementation, too.
Methodologically, I test my hypotheses by applying time-series cross-section
methods to an original dataset, a significant improvement on prior studies, in that:
(i) I compare all the member states involved in the programme, thus increasing the
coverage of most previous studies (inter alia Milio 2008; Hagemann 2019); and (ii) I
control for country-to-country but also year-to-year variation where previous quantitat-
ive analyses have reasoned on values averaged over several years, thus ignoring vari-
ation of implementation over time (inter alia Tosun 2014), with the consequence of
overestimating the role of structural factors to the detriment of more situational
explanations.
In sum, the contribution this article intends to bring about is threefold. Firstly, it mod-
estly contributes to the absorption literature by testing its hypotheses on a fund with looser
rules and by refining preference-based explanations. Secondly, it contributes to the small –
but growing – body of studies on the EU’s integration policy, a policy set to last if one con-
siders the sequels of the EIF in the 2014–2020 but also 2021–2027 financial frameworks2
currently being negotiated. Thirdly, it proposes a time-sensitive model of analysis to better
take account of external shocks on implementation.
The first section of this article describes the EIF and the extent to which it is similar to
(and different from) the structural funds. In so doing, I demonstrate that the EIF is a good
case to test my hypotheses. The second section reviews the literature on absorption and
compliance; I state my hypotheses while doing so. The third section briefly describes
the research design, data and model (further technical details are provided in the online
appendix). The fourth section presents and discusses the empirical findings. Strong
support is found for capacity explanans and little for preferences. Even so, administrative
capacity appears to be one factor amongst many, with financial capacity and decentraliza-
tion playing a strong role too. Finally, I conclude in a fifth section.
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Why study the EIF?
The EIF: a brief description
The European Integration Fund (EIF) is a rather small fund of €825 million aimed at sup-
porting member states’ integration efforts over the years 2007–2013. It was created in
2007, following an earlier call for a “more vigorous integration policy” on the part of
the member states gathered at the European Council of Tampere in 1999 (European
Council 1999). Immigration to the EU has drastically increased over the years (OECD
2016). If it has undeniable positive economic effects in an ageing society (European Com-
mission 2011), migration also poses considerable socio-economic challenges to the
member states (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2013). In order to ease integration and
reap the benefits migration holds, the EU has gradually developed an integration policy.
Despite about 20 years of existence, this policy has attracted little scholarly attention
(Mulcahy 2011 and Van Wolleghem 2019a, 2019b are exceptions). Likewise, the EIF
has gone almost unnoticed, despite being cited in passing in most articles touching
upon integration at the EU level (see inter alia Geddes and Achtnich 2015; Pratt 2015;
Scholten and Penninx 2016). There do exist though some reports3 and papers that
looked into its implementation. Carrera and Atger (2011) investigated the substantive
aspects of the fund and the projects it financed over the first three years of implementation
whilst Van Wolleghem (2017) sought to explain member states’ response to orientations
given by the EU as to the fund’s spending. Both studies however, concentrated on the pro-
gramming phase, leaving aside the actual use of the money available. Van Wolleghem
(2019a) has provided a first attempt to explain the use of the EIF by pitting capacity
against preference and found a prevalent role of capacity. This paper builds upon the
latter and refines both sets of hypotheses to discuss the findings and provide sounder
empirical results.
The EIF: a good case-study
The EIF is an interesting case to study the factors that determine absorption of EU funds;
this for at least two reasons: (i) it presents features that are, to some extent, similar to that
of the structural funds, thus suggesting that some of the findings relating to the former
may be valid for the latter; and (ii) it follows simpler implementation rules which, in
theory at least, should relax the assumption whereby administrative capacity determines
absorption. The rest of this section shall aim to point out the similarities and dissimilarities
between the EIF and the structural funds.
First and foremost, the EIF is much smaller than the structural funds; smaller but much
more flexible in its spending rules.4 Despite the fact that it was “copied” from the structural
fund’s design5, the EIF’s decision-making process led to the elimination of the most con-
straining provisions. As no formal competence existed on integration matters back in the
day6, the adoption of policy instruments went through unanimity voting with the conse-
quence of shrinking member states’ obligations.7 Resultantly, the principle of additionality,
which prevents member states from substituting their national funding with EU funding,
was removed. Likewise, the principle of partnership, which provides for the association of
a range of actors (chiefly regional and local authorities) to the decision-making, was
made optional.8 Carrera and Atger (2011) show that the principle was applied mostly in
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the initial programming phase, and in a consultative fashion. Unlike the structural funds,
which provide for a considerable involvement of sub-national bodies for the design of
Regional Operational Programmes, nothing of the like was in place for the EIF. Without
the additionality principle and with a weak partnership principle, the use of EU money
was left to the discretion of national governments, thus facilitating its absorption.
Secondly, like the structural funds, the EIF relies on the co-financing principle whereby
EU money finances a share of a project. As a rule, EU co-financing amounts to 50% of
integration projects; a share that may be increased to 75% where the state addresses
specific indications. By way of derogation, the member states falling under the cohesion
fund receive 75% of EU co-financing unconditionally. Member states are therefore
required to co-finance 25–50% of the projects financed under the fund.9
Thirdly, unlike structural funds, the principle underlying the EIF does not consider
financial imbalances among member states. Whereas the distribution of structural
funds is aimed at reducing economic disparities, the EIF is distributed as a function of
the stocks and fluxes of third country nationals granted legal residence, irrespective of
the differences in wealth between member states. Member states thus receive an allocation
that is proportional to the number of new-comers they grant residence to. In theory, and
because they have committed to the objectives of the fund, member states should have
little trouble implementing it.
Figure 1 shows a starker reality. It reports the means and standard deviations of the
fund’s implementation rates by country; i.e. the proportion of the money they actually
Figure 1. Implementation rate means and standard deviations over the period 2007-2013, for 26
member states.
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engaged compared to the amount they were allocated. Only 82.3% of the money avail-
able was spent over the seven years of the programme, less than what is usually engaged
for the structural funds (with a grand mean at 92.4%; see Tosun 2014). This dry figure,
however, covers a more hectic reality: some member states have had a very low
implementation rate with high variation from one year to another (such as Malta,
Ireland or Slovenia) whereas others display a high and steady implementation rate
(Poland, Italy or Germany for instance). Some countries display surprising figures.
The United Kingdom’s implementation means stalls at 55% for a policy it opted in
for.10 At the other end, Lithuania displays a steady 99.8% implementation rate. Interest-
ingly, there is almost as much variation between countries as there is within: the average
implementation rate may vary upward or downward by about 15 points between one
country and another and by about 14 points for the same country from one year to
another (see Table 1); thus confirming the need to account for the variation of
implementation rates over time.
Explaining the implementation gap of the EIF
Whereas few studies have looked into migration-related funds, the structural funds have
attracted a significant amount of scholarly attention since their inception. However,
most studies have concentrated on how to explain the allocation of the funds (Kemmer-
ling and Bodenstein 2006; Bouvet and Dall’Erba 2010; Dellmuth 2011; Barca, McCann,
and Rodríguez-Pose 2012; Mendez 2013; Schraff 2014), and only recently has the focus
shifted to the actual implementation with attempts to answer the question why member
states engage or not their respective allocations (Horvat 2005; Milio 2007, 2008; Hapen-
ciuc, Moroşan, and Gaube 2013; Bachtler, Mendez, and Oraže 2014; Tosun 2014; Dotti
2016; Terracciano and Graziano 2016; Hagemann 2017, 2019). These studies have
mostly considered the capacity member states show in absorbing structural funds.
True, spending EU funds can be demanding since it requires a sound administrative
and organizational structure on the one hand and national budgetary capacity on the
other. Capacity therefore endorses different meanings that are dependent on the charac-
teristics of the fund itself (NEI 2002). One is administrative capacity; the ability of the
administration to evaluate, contract, implement and monitor the projects covered by the
fund (Milio 2007). In order to use the amounts it is allocated, the state must ensure it
follows management and financial rules and foresees monitoring and control mechan-
isms; notably through the designation of a responsible authority (usually ministries of
the interior for the EIF), a certifying authority (for the expenditure) and an audit auth-
ority. Accordingly, administrative capacity likely eases implementation; and the higher
the administrative capacity, the swifter the adaptation to EU requirements (and hence
the higher the implementation rate).
Table 1. Difference in implementation rates between and within units.
Implementation rate Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Variation 83.343 20.444 0 113.91
Within 14 38.702 127.777
Between 15.01 47.227 101.14
Note: Total number of observations = 152; number of groups = 26; number of observations per group = 5.85.
POLICY STUDIES 5
H1a: The higher the administrative capacity, the higher the implementation rate.
H1b: The higher the administrative capacity, the swifter a high implementation rate is
reached.
Besides administrative capacity, budgetary capacity likely eases the absorption of the
fund, particularly because of the co-financing principle (Horvat 2005; Tosun 2014).
Different aspects of budgetary capacity matter though. Firstly, member states have
different migration histories and they may therefore relate differently to integration pol-
icies. A member state that already had a sizable budget for integration in the past is
more likely to be able to absorb the EIF than a member state that has to create a
budget for integration ex-nihilo. The absence of the additionality principle (see above)
reinforces the role of a previous integration budget in absorbing the funding.11 Secondly,
global financial capacity is likely to matter (NEI 2002; Horvat 2005; Tosun 2014), notably
over a timespan characterized by the economic downturn of the late 2000s (Carrera and
Atger 2011; Collett 2011). Therefore, a higher GDP per capita likely eases absorption; like-
wise, negative change in GDP is likely to go with a lower implementation rate.
H2a: The higher previous funding for integration policy, the higher the implementation rate.
H2b: The higher the GDP per capita, the higher the implementation rate.
H2c: The more GDP decreases, the lower the implementation rate
Another understanding of capacity ought to consider the administrative organization
of the state. Namely, the level of decentralization is likely to play a significant role in
that matter. Findings in compliance literature have shown that implementation varies
according to the level of decentralization: compliance with EU law may be lower where
competences are shared amongst different levels of decision-making (Mbaye 2001;
König and Luetgert 2009). The object of these studies, however, revolves around timely
and correct transposition of EU Directives. Implementation therefore regards a constraint
to comply with rules adopted above rather than taking advantage of financial opportunities
to tackle local issues. In response, the literature on structural funds has posited the positive
role of decentralization in easing EU funds’ absorption (Milio 2007; Tosun 2014; Dotti
2016). In decentralized states, subnational authorities may possess the institutional struc-
tures and resources to better absorb the funds. They may also be more dependent on the
generation of their own revenue in which case they would be incentivized to use the funds
available. Whilst immigration is mostly a national competence, integration is often
devolved to lower levels of government (Hepburn 2010; Thränhardt 2014), save in
cases of strong centralist tradition (Scholten and Penninx 2016). In a decentralized
state, the number of co-implementers consistently rises which increases the probability
of a higher implementation rate.
H3: The more decentralized the state, the higher the implementation rate.
A last acceptation of capacity ought to be considered given the specificities of the EIF:
the capacity of co-implementers; namely civil society organizations (CSOs). Out-sourcing
government activities is a common way to cut public expenses (Majone 1999) and CSOs
are primary targets for the implementation of the EIF. As evaluation reports show, NGOs
feature amongst the most numerous12 beneficiaries of the fund (Ramboll 2013).
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Considered as direct co-implementers, they are likely to boost the implementation rate,
provided they display the capacity to meet the accountability requirements set by EU
rules in order to comply with the sound financial management principle.
H4: The higher CSO capacity, the higher the implementation rate.
The literature on the absorption of structural funds has seldom looked into more pol-
itical explanations; even though studies on the funds’ allocation found that politics mat-
tered (Kemmerling and Bodenstein 2006; Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012; Schraff 2014).
Notable exceptions are worth mentioning though. Milio (2008) compares three Italian
regions and finds that political changes affect administrative capacity, which in turn
effects absorption. Hagemann (2017, 2019) investigates Central and Eastern European
states’ absorption of the funds prior to their accession to the EU and finds that poor
capacity along with frequent changes of political control leads to absorption problems.
Dotti (2016) compares five western EU member states and finds that political alignment
between regions and central state leads to greater implementation. All in all, these studies
present limitations. Beyond the restricted coverage in terms of cases compared, they
propose a specific understanding of politics that proves problematic. The first two
authors conceptualize politics in a way that is not independent of capacity. Resultantly,
they find that political change affects capacity more than it affects absorption. Then, all
three authors somehow leave aside issues more directly connected to politics, i.e. substan-
tive positions, salience of issues or conflict within coalitions in office at the national level;
yet three constitutive aspects of the impact of politics onto policy. This paper heeds these
shortcomings and takes advantage of the specifics of the EIF to refine the conceptualiz-
ation of the role of politics (or preferences for that matter) and apply it to a larger
group of member states.
To do so, I draw on the compliance literature. This strand, too, has posited the role of
capacity-based factors in facilitating or hampering implementation (Pridham 1994; Lam-
pinen and Uusikylä 1998; Mbaye 2001; Falkner, Hartlapp, and Treib 2007). But it has
above all taken a close look at the role of preferences in explaining compliance (Giuliani
2003; Steunenberg 2007; Thomson, Torenvlied, and Arregui 2007; König and Luetgert
2009). In the case at issue, and considering the characteristics of the EIF, central govern-
ments’ preferences are most capable of explaining outcomes, as opposed to regional pre-
ferences, more suitable for the study of the structural funds (Dotti 2016). That is, member
states’ central administrations are given the possibility to maintain a firm grip on the use of
the EIF to pursue their preferences with little involvement of subnational authorities in the
policy-making process.13 Their preferences therefore matter, provided they are compatible
with the goals established for the EIF (position on the issue), relatively shared amongst the
government coalition’s members (conflict within coalition on the issue), and important for
the government in office (saliency of the issue). These three elements are inter-related but
presented in turn for better legibility.
As provided for by the EIF Decision in its article 2, the overall objective of the fund is to
support the member states in their effort to enable third country nationals to fulfil the con-
ditions of residence and to facilitate their integration into European societies, as well as to
observe the principle that integration is a two-way process of mutual accommodation by
natives and migrants.14 Consequently, a government that has a position on integration
that is balanced between assimilation and multiculturalism15 is more likely to be able to
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use the whole of the fund. To put it differently, a government that presents strong assim-
ilationist preferences may fail to implement the “two-way process of mutual accommo-
dation” between natives and newcomers whilst a government that strongly supports
multiculturalism may fail to implement measures linked to the basic knowledge of the
host society.16
H5: The more balanced the preferences of government between assimilation and multicultur-
alism, the higher the implementation rate.
That said, governments are seldom monolithic entities. Oftentimes they consist in
coalitions of parties with potentially diverging preferences on the issue. The distance
between the preferences of the parties that constitute the coalition (Tsebelis 2002) may
therefore hamper agreement as to how to spend the fund and, eventually, prevent its
actual spending.
H6: The higher the distance between the preferences of the parties in a coalition, the lower the
implementation rate.
Furthermore, integration may not be a priority of the government in office, and spend-
ing national resources may backfire in coming elections (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen
2013). Taking advantage of the fund may thus have consequences on national politics. All
the more so since immigration-related issues tend to be salient for the public. Several EU
barometers over the 2000s and 2010s show that immigration ranks amongst Europeans’
most important concerns.17 In spring 2015, it revealed that immigration was the foremost
concern for EU citizens, before economics and unemployment (Les Echos 2015). Also,
VanWolleghem (2017) showed that salience of the issue was determinant in the EIF’s pro-
gramming phase. Since policy-makers have limited attention available (Howlett and Giest
2013) salience in public opinion may contrast government’s ability to take advantage of
the money available (salience for public opinion will therefore be controlled for; see
below, see also Spendzharova and Versluis 2013).
H7: The more salient integration is for government, the higher the implementation rate.
Research design
Studies on the implementation of structural funds vary significantly in the methods they
use. Milio (2007, 2008) and Hagemann (2017, 2019) use qualitative methods, thus limiting
their case coverage; Milio resorts to case-studies methods whilst Hagemann uses fuzzy-sets
qualitative comparative analysis (FsQCA). Other studies employ quantitative methods to
investigate the absorption of structural funds in a comparative manner with increased cov-
erage (Hapenciuc, Moroşan, and Gaube 2013; Tosun 2014). However, they have tested
their hypotheses on dependent variables with values averaged over the implementation
period. As a consequence, these studies have emphasized the role of structural factors;
those that do not change much over the years. Yet, Figure 1 and Table 1 show that, at
least in the case of the EIF, the implementation rate may vary a great deal from one
year to another, thus hinting at the importance of more situational explanations. Accord-
ingly, an adequate comparative method shall account for year-to-year variation. This
section briefly describes the data, operationalization of the variables, and the method
used. Descriptive statistics and robustness tests are available in the online appendix.
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Data and operationalization
The data covers the entire period of implementation of the EIF; i.e. 2007–2013, and considers
the 26member states that took part in the fund.18 I use as a dependent variable the implemen-
tation rate of EU funding; i.e. the share of EIFmoney actually spent compared to the amount
available, per year and per country. This percentage is drawn frommember states’ final evalu-
ation reports.19 Due to missing values and to the fund’s inception specificities, the dataset
counts 152 entries instead of the 182 expected (see detail in appendix). In order to test my
hypotheses, values for the independent variables correspond to the longer period of eligibility
of expenses as per Commission Decision; that is, the year following the programming period.
Administrative capacity is measured with the Worldwide Governance Indicator on
government effectiveness (Kaufman and Kraay 2015). Established by the World Bank,
this indicator summarizes the quality of the administration as to policy formulation
and implementation and quality of public services. It covers all EU member states over
the entire period of the spending of the fund.
Financial capacity is threefold and covers specific and global capacity. Specific funding
capacity for integration policy is measured through the budget member states allocated to
integration prior to the inception of the fund (in 2006 if available, in 2007 otherwise).
Information is drawn from member states’ multiannual programmes.20 As for global
financial capacity, I consider member states’ GDP per capita and the annual percentage
change of the latter.21 This allows a more dynamic concept of financial capacity that
accounts for the economic downturn of the late 2000s. This data is taken from the
World Bank’s world development indicators.
I then use the Regional Authority Index (RAI; Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2016) as a
measure of decentralization within member states. Covering a wide range of dimensions
(notably fiscal and political), it is deemed to be the most comprehensive indicator of
decentralization (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose 2013). Since the data available covers the
period 1950–2010, four years are missing (2011–2014). I therefore average the values
over the period 2006–2010 in order to fill the gap. This can be done for at least three
reasons. Firstly, the literature on regionalism dates the decentralization process across
Europe with the reform of the Cohesion policy in the late 1980s. For new member
states, the same phenomenon can be observed as an effect of conditionality on their acces-
sion to the EU (Bachtler andMcMaster 2008). Resultantly, little change in decentralization
is expected for the period 2006–2014. Secondly, a look at the RAI trend over the 1950–
2010 period confirms the devolution process occurred mostly from the 1980s to the
early 2000s. Thirdly, no significant change is observable from 2006 to 2010, confirming
the possibility to average the values and apply them over the period considered.
CSO capacity is hard to capture. I use as a proxy the percentage of the working popu-
lation working for NGOs/the non-profit sector (EuroFound 2010). The advantage of this
proxy is that: (i) it covers all member states; (ii) it is one of the main components of many
civil society indicators (Global Civil Society Index, CIVICUS, CSO Sustainability Index,
Third Sector Impact Project); and (iii) it summarizes CSOs’ financial and administrative
capacity and so captures the idea of CSOs which may act as co-implementer (it does not
count volunteering but professionals within organizations competing for funding). The
downside of it is that data is only available for 2010 so that I cannot capture potential
change over the period considered. In a different manner, this indicator does not
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account for CSOs’ sector of activity so that the variable does not specifically consider CSOs
concerned with migration. Note that, integration being a multifaceted phenomenon
(Penninx 2013), the CSOs likely interested in integration programmes need not be directly
concerned with integration.
The role of politics (positions, their distance and salience) is tested using the Chapel
Hill expert survey 2010 (CHES; Bakker, de Vries, and Edwards 2012). CHES proposes a
measurement of preferences and salience for political parties, not for government. Since
governments consist of a coalition of parties in many instances, I traced back the
parties in office for each implementation year and I aggregated their measured preferences
and salience following Gamson’s law (Browne and Franklin 1973). Preferences are placed
on a scale ranging from multiculturalism to assimilation. To obtain a scale in terms of
strongly leaning preferences or balanced preferences, I have centred the values around
the neutral point, squared them (to get rid of negative values) and then taken their
square root. As for the distance between parties’ preferences in coalition, I have taken
the variance of their respective positions.
To test my hypotheses, some controls are in order. First of all, as mentioned in H7,
public opinion may shrink the impact of government preferences insofar as an attentive
public may blame government for the action it takes and therefore weigh on government’s
will to implement. Salience of immigration in public opinion is measured thanks to Euro-
barometers 67.2–78.1 (TNS Opinion and Social 2007) with the question “what do you
think are the most important issues facing your country at the moment?” (two answers
possible). Since Eurobarometer is conducted twice a year, I averaged the two to obtain
a yearly value. Secondly, the passage of time is controlled for. Since the policy instrument
is new, its inception may have strained the administration which may in turn delay
effective implementation at the outset. With the passage of time, the administration is
likely to learn and adapt to the fund’s requirements. Since learning cannot be appropri-
ately measured, time is controlled for.
Method of analysis
In order to test the validity of my hypotheses over time and space, I use time-series
cross-section methods22 and implement a mixed effects multilevel model that accounts
for auto-correlation (Beck 2006; Kohler and Kreuter 2012). Because fixed effects models
compute a coefficient for each cluster (here member states), they absorb the variation
between them thus biasing the estimates of time-invariant variables (or variables with
little change over time). Random effects for countries and years of implementation
are therefore preferred to fixed effects. The tests run confirm that such a model can
be used to fit the data at hand.23 Given the nature of my dataset (finite and small popu-
lation), I use a residual maximum likelihood (REML) estimation technique (Patterson
and Thomson 1971; Kreft and de Leeuw 1998; Oehlert 2012). The ideal model would
be a beta or fractional regression model (Ospina and Ferrari 2012) but such models
are yet to be developed as a routine technique for multilevel models. I therefore
provide the results of robustness tests (in appendix) to allow the reader to assess the
soundness of my conclusions.
Model (1) is a two-level model (space and time) testing the hypotheses linked to
member states’ capacity to implement. Model (2) reprocesses the same variables but
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adds to them the variables linked to preferences. Model (3) repeats model (2) and includes
an interaction between administrative capacity and time. The table’s fourth column pro-
duces beta (or standardized) coefficients for model (2).
Empirical analysis
The empirical results reported in the table below show a prevalent effect of capacity over pre-
ferences.24 Even so, not all aspects of capacity matter. The effect of administrative capacity
(H1a) is substantively strong and statistically significant. Its effect is best captured in
model 2, according to which the ability of the administration to formulate and implement
policies does matter when it comes to using the EIF. The computation of standardized coeffi-
cients also reveals that administrative capacity is the variable that affects the outcome the
most. This result confirms the findings put forth in absorption literature (Milio 2007;
Tosun 2014) and nuances those relating to the EU’s integration policy.25 Model (1) proposes
contrasting results, with administrative capacity’s coefficient being affected, both in magni-
tude and statistical significance, by the absence of preference-based variables.26 Financial
capacity also proves to matter somehow. Despite the absence of effect of GDP per capita
(H2b), its variation from one year to the next does have a significant and sizeable effect on
the ability of governments to implement the fund (H2c; model 1–3), thereby contrasting
with Tosun (2014). A 1% increase in GDP is associated with a change of 0.9 percentage
point in the implementation rate. The economic crisis that hit Europe in the late 2000s
has forced governments to cut public budgets across the board with dire consequences on
integration policies (Carrera and Atger 2011; Collett 2011). Figure 2 describes for instance
the relationship between overall yearly implementation rate and overall yearly change in
Figure 2. Annual overall implementation rate (%) and annual overall change in GDP per capita (%), for
Annual Programmes 2007–2013, 26 member states.
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GDP per capita. The fall in GDP is highly associated with the fall of implementation rates.
Unexpectedly, the availability of previous funding at national level negatively affects the
use of the fund (H2a; model 1–3), despite the absence of the principle of additionality (see
above). The most likely explanation lies with the fact that, given the lengthy implementation
rules compared to the size of the envelope, the amounts allocated represent little incentive to
use them for countries with significant integration budgets.27 Differently, decentralization
(H3) appears to be a strong (as the beta coefficient confirms) and statistically significant
determinant of the actual use of the funding available so that the more decentralized the
administration, the higher the implementation rate (model 1–3). This is an interesting
result as it contradicts empirical evidence brought forward in both research on compliance
(Mbaye 2001; König and Luetgert 2009) and research on absorption (Tosun 2014; Tosun
hypothesized the positive role of decentralization but did not find supporting evidence).
As hypothesized, the fund seems to represent an opportunity to finance local integration pol-
icies and tackle local integration challenges (Table 2; Figure 2).
Table 2. Implementation of the European Integration Fund across member states, 2008-2013.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Model (2);
β coefficient
Administrative capacity 6.167 16.442 *** 14.058 ** 9.701
(6.675) (6.055) (7.128)
Previous funding −0.038 * −0.036 ** −0.035 ** −6.743
(0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
GDP per capita −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −5.153
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Δ GDP per capita 0.904 ** 0.852 ** 0.883 ** 3.305
(0.360) (0.370) (0.374)
Decentralization 0.912 *** 0.836 *** 0.835 *** 9.238
(0.324) (0.286) (0.280)
CSO capacity 1.118 −0.113 −0.162 −0.152
(2.744) (2.291) (2.288)
Government preference 0.088 0.075 0.086
(1.982) (1.987)
Conflict within coalition −3.045 *** −2.955 ** −4.089
(1.137) (1.147)
Salience for government −0.055 −0.060 −0.094
(1.853) (1.852)
Public opinion −0.455 −0.463 −3.590
(0.368) (0.369)
Time effect 0.476 0.044 −0.882 0.075
(0.782) (0.774) (1.665)
Adm. Cap. * Time 0.785
(1.251)




Std.D Year 1.45e-07 2.03e-09 9.56e-08
(0.000) (8.13e-09) (4.32e-07)
Std.D Constant 13.188 10.403 10.362
(2.547) (2.353) (2.253)
Std.D Residual 14.370 13.607 13.648
(0.919) (0.906) (0.913)
Model fit
Prob. > Wald chi2 0.008 0.001 0.002
Multilevel vs. linear model; Prob.>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of obs: 143; Number of groups: 25; Avg obs per group: 5.7.
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1 Std.error in parenthesis.
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CSO capacity displays coefficients that are both limited in magnitude and statisti-
cally insignificant, despite its presumed role hypothesized from evaluation reports
(Ramboll 2013). The likely explanation is, the difficulty to rely on CSOs to spend
EU money may be an obstacle to complete implementation but the discretion the
central state enjoys in the way it spends the EIF may help compensate.28 Alternatively,
the role sub-national authorities play in the implementation likely offsets potentially
weak CSO capacity. From a different standpoint, the passage of time has no effect
whatsoever, even when considered together with administrative capacity (H1b;
model 3).
Turning now to preferences, the hypotheses tested are not significant (neither substan-
tively nor statistically), save for conflicting preferences within a coalition, which is signifi-
cant: conflict in coalition on the issue decreases implementation rates. Note though that its
effect is sensitive to influential observations29 and comparatively weaker than most
capacity-based coefficients (see fourth column). Eventually, it is more member states’
capacity to spend than their will to engage the funding that matters. A plausible reason
for this lies in the fact that the purposes pursued by the fund are not highly ideologically
marked (as are the debates on citizenship or voting rights for foreigners; see Poppelaars
and Scholten 2008; Keating 2009) so that preferences of central governments are less
likely to affect implementation outcomes.
Conclusion
The ability of EU funds to meet their goals is jeopardized by a consistent implementation
gap: at the end of each implementation period, a good deal of the money allocated ends up
unspent. In response, a strand in literature has developed which aims to shed light on the
phenomenon. A number of studies have shown that administrative capacity is key in
explaining why member states do not spend the money they have available: given the
many and complex rules governing the spending of EU money, more effective adminis-
trations should perform better at spending EU money. If it were so though, looser spend-
ing rules should translate into greater implementation rates. The implementation of the
European Integration Fund (EIF) suggests that it is not necessarily so. At the end of the
EIF’s implementation period, the percentage of used money stalled at 82.3%; a figure
on average lower than that for the structural funds. This summary figure, however,
covers wide disparities in terms of use between member states and over the years,
ranging on average (but with wide dispersion around the mean in some instances)
from 42% for Malta to a little more than a 100% for Finland. Therefore, this article
sought to explain variation across country and over time. Namely, why is it that some
countries in some years use the totality of the funding available whilst some others do
not? Drawing from different strands in literature, I have put two main series of expla-
nations to the test. On the one hand, I have tested the role of member states’ capacity
to engage EU funding, as suggested by absorption scholarship. On the other hand, I
have posited the effect of preferences on implementation, inspiring my hypotheses from
the literature on compliance with EU outputs. The results show that capacity, more
than preferences, matters in the implementation of the EIF. Confirming the findings
put forth in absorption scholarship, the role of administrative capacity appears to
explain implementation rates to a significant extent, even with looser implementation
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rules. Contrasting the same findings, I show that decentralization and financial capacity
play a positive role in the use of the fund. The actual use of EU money seems to be in
part determined by macro-economic changes over time and the existence of a network
of subnational bodies that act as co-implementers. Upstream, it appears that economic
ups and downs had dire consequences on the ability to absorb the funding available;
the economic crisis and ensuing public debt crisis of the late 2000s-early 2010s strained
public finances and forced budget cuts across the board. Downstream, decentralization
has eased the spending of the EIF. In decentralized states, the competence of integrating
migrants likely falls to sub-national authorities which take advantage of the fund to tackle
local integration challenges.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that even though administrative capacity
matters to a significant extent, simplifying spending rules may not translate into increased
use of EU money. Loosening co-financing requirements may allow a higher implemen-
tation rate but such a solution implies a trade-off between effectiveness at EU level and
accountability at national level. Decreasing the co-financing share may translate into
increased implementation but it may also shrink the incentive for efficient spending on
the part of the public administration. Regarding more specifically the EIF, the results pre-
sented suggest the amounts of the EIF do not constitute a good enough incentive for their
spending, a finding that may affect the EIF’s sequels. Bigger amounts or less demanding
administrative and financial requirements could translate into higher implementation
but would necessarily come at a cost, either monetary or in terms of accountability.
Given the foregoing, and albeit preferences proved unable to influence the outcome in
the case of the EIF, higher implementation rates may be attained by increasing member
states’ commitment to the purposes of the policy in the prospect of integration funds
to come.
Notes
1. Dotti studies two southern Italian regions whilst Hagemann considers Central and Eastern
European states prior to their accession to the EU. See below for more.
2. The latter should also considerably expand the resources available for the integration of
migrants. See European Commission (2018); Van Wolleghem (2019b).
3. Several EU reports have looked into the implementation of the EIF (Ramboll 2011, 2013;
European Court of Auditors 2012). They highlight the issues that arose in the process in a
descriptive fashion without undertaking systematic or complete (most were written before
the end of the programme) analysis of implementation. Some hypotheses stated below
directly draw from such reports.
4. As a smaller fund, the incentive for the spending it represents is lesser (this is controlled for in
the empirical analysis); this is, however, counterbalanced by simpler implementation rules.
5. See European Commission (2006). The Commission declared to have ‘copied’ the provisions
relating to spending rules from the structural funds.
6. No reference to integration existed in EU primary law until the adoption of the treaty of
Lisbon. The only reference to it was to legal migration, which did not encompass integration
(Handoll 2012).
7. See Franchino (2007) for an interesting account in this respect.
8. For more on these two principles, see Bachtler and Mendez (2007).
9. Note that, since there is no additionality principle, co-financing is made easier in cases where
the member state presents a significant integration budget. This is reflected in the hypotheses
stated below.
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10. The United Kingdom does not systematically take part in policies relating to the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice. It may, however, opt in for some policies; as it did for the EIF.
11. In this respect, Slovenia advocated the removal of the principle of additionality, motivating it
with the greater absorption it would allow for countries with a recent migration history. See
Council of the European Union 2006.
12. Note that most numerous does not mean that most of the resources went to NGOs. In some
cases, one project (for instance state-sponsored) used up almost all the resources available.
See Carrera and Atger (2011).
13. A particularly demonstrative example is that of France that used at least 90% of the first two
years of allocations to finance its national integration strategy (see Carrera and Atger 2011, 40)
14. See Decision 2007/435/EC, art. 2.1 and 2.2.
15. The concepts of assimilation and multiculturalism have been extensively discussed in the
specialised literature. They are here considered as a policy preferences. Assimilation refers
to a policy preference viewing integration as a one-sided process of adaptation whereby
migrants are to be incorporated into the host society (Brubaker 2001) whereas multicultur-
alism refers to the acceptance and (sometimes) promotion of long-term cultural differences
(Kymlicka 1995).
16. For reasons of space, I do not go further on this. Mulcahy (2011) proposes a good description
of the extent to which the EU integration policy swings back and forth between assimilation
and multiculturalism.
17. See notably Eurobarometer 60 in 2004 and Eurobarometer 83 in 2015.
18. Croatia was not a member at the time and Denmark does not partake in the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice.
19. Note that such reports are not available to the public but may be requested to the European
Commission.
20. Note that what is considered is the funding allocated precisely to integration and not to
asylum as refugees fall out of the scope of the EIF (see European Refugee Fund).
21. Based on constant local currency.
22. Time-series cross-section models are nowadays well known in the academic community so
that there is no need to go into too much depth here. Only the specifics are detailed. See Beck
(2006) for more on the model.
23. See online appendix for a more detailed discussion.
24. Coefficients are discussed regardless of their statistical significance for at least three reasons:
(i) this article is based on a finite population rather than on a representative sample; (ii) the
population is rather small; (iii) statistical and substantive significance are two different con-
cepts. See appendix for more on this.
25. Van Wolleghem (2019a) found an effect of similar magnitude but dismissed it due to a stat-
istical significance resulting from influential observations. The model specification presented
here proposes a more robust estimate.
26. Model (2) though seems to better summarize the data. From the robustness tests run, it
appears that model (1) is misspecified and may, therefore, yield biased estimated. See Appen-
dix for more information on the matter.
27. One may argue that the financial incentive may interact with administrative capacity in that a
strong financial incentive could counterbalance low administrative capacity. Note that: (i) an
interaction of the two terms proves statistically insignificant; and (ii) administrative capa-
city’s beta coefficient is much greater than that for previous funding, thus dismissing the
hypothesis of one term counterbalancing the other.
28. Member states could, for example, issue new calls for proposals, revise their programmes or
reallocate funds between actions and priorities, so that difficulties in spending the money
could be overcome. Differently, member states had the possibility to spend the money them-
selves, following the executing body procedure. See Ramboll 2011, 45.
29. Dropping two level-1 influential observations dismisses the statistical significance and signifi-
cantly decreases the coefficient’s magnitude. See appendix for more detail.
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